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John Humphrey*
This IDS Bulletin brings together some of the results
of research funded by the Department for
InternationalDevelopment (DFID) in a three-year
programmeof research on globalisation andpoverty.
This research programme consisted of 14 different
research projects spread across 13 UK institutions
and their research partners in developing countries.
The articles here display only a small part of the
richness and diversity of the results of the research.
Material from all 14 projects can be found at the
programme website (www.gapresearch.org).Similarly,
more extensive researchmaterials from the projects
presented in this collection can also be found at the
website.
For any research project on globalisation and
poverty, the big question is what is the impact of
globalisation on poverty reduction in developing
countries? Is it part of the problem, or part of the
solution? However attractive it seems to pose this
question, it is a mistake, both analytically and
practically:
1. Globalisation as an economic process is often
characterised as increasing economic integration
achieved through the increasingly free flow of
capital, goods and services and people across
national boundaries. However, there are
different sets of processes, moving at different
speeds. Trade and capital account liberalisation
have progressed substantially, although in
different ways, while migration has not only
been constrained, but has become more
disordered, often occurring in spite of attempts
to prevent it.
2. It is important to distinguish between an
idealised global economy and globalisation as
it exists, with all its imperfections. Just as Stiglitz
argues that ‘much of the neoliberal program
compared an ideal market economy with the
average or worse performing states’ (2001: 4,
emphasis in original), so the benefits of
globalisation are often considered in relation to
how globalisation processes ought to work,
rather than the less than perfect “actually existing
globalisation”.
3. The impact of globalisation on any particular
economy depends not only on multiple
globalisation processes, but also the
characteristics of the developing countries
themselves. These vary in important ways, and
certainly not only in terms of the policies adopted
by governments. Therefore, the same processes
can lead to different outcomes.
4. Finally, the outcomes of globalisation processes
depend significantly on the way that they are
managed. The idea of “managing globalisation”
has come to the fore as some of the actual
outcomes of globalisation processes have proved
disappointing.1 Inmany cases, this management
refers primarily to the policies adopted by
developing countries, extending such issues as
sequencing of liberalisation and complementary
policies for the restructuring of the domestic
economy andmacroeconomic stability.However,
it could just as well refer to the management of
globalisation processes in the areas of trade,
finance and global governance.
The articles in this Bulletin explore various aspects
of globalisation processes “as they exist”, and in
specific country and institutional contexts. In this
way, they contribute to a better understanding of
these processes and identify specific policy
interventions. The articles are grouped into three
sets, based upon the three principal areas covered
by the programme: production and trade, finance
and foreign direct investment (FDI) and the
institutions of global governance.
1 Production and trade
In a widely cited article, RaviKanbur discusses the
root causes of disagreements over globalisation.
One of the three root causes is a difference in
perception about market structure and power
(Kanbur 2001: 1089–91). Themore confident one
is that markets work efficiently, themore onemight
expect trade liberalisation to have overall positive
effects, even if there will inevitably be winners and
losers.
The level of confidence in market forces also
leads to particular diagnoses of why the results of
trade liberalisation are sometimes disappointing.
Just to take one example, the report of a meeting
onmainstreaming trade into country development
strategies held at the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in January 2001, noted that: ‘Properly
managed, integration into the world economy has
been shown to be a powerful instrument in
achieving and sustaining high rates of economic
growth and reducing poverty’ (WTO 2001: 112).
Nevertheless, this statement is followed by the
observation that: ‘although the poorest countries
are clearly integrating into the world economy, the
benefits accruing to themhave been disappointing.
The share of the poorest countries in global trade
declined from 0.8 per cent in 1980 to 0.4 per cent
today. TheGEP [Global Economic Prospects] 2001
projects that per capita incomes in sub-Saharan
Africa will only expand by only 0.5 per cent in the
coming decade’ (WTO 2001: 112).
One possible response to this disappointing
outcome is to attribute it to policy failures, both in
the application of trade liberalisation and in the
development of complementary policies. In addition
to policies aimed at avoiding macroeconomic
disequilibria, the WTO document suggests
deregulation to promote themobility of labour and
capital and liberalisation services and finance.
However, this seems tomiss the point.The effects
of trade liberalisation are both much more
substantial than one might project from standard
trade theory (Stiglitz 1998: 26), and also much
more uneven. Some countries have benefited
enormously, while others struggle to turn outward
orientation into the economic growth that will, in
turn, tend to reduce poverty. Therefore, it is
important to understand the ways in whichmarkets
operate in specific circumstances and how this
affects responses to trade liberalisation.
The first article in this Bulletin, by Round and
Whalley, is based upon studies of the linkages
between trade liberalisation and poverty in four
SouthAsian countries, using amodelling approach.
Overall, the article argues that linkages between
globalisation and poverty are difficult to determine.
The authors caution against generalisations about
such linkages,demonstrating, first, just how difficult
it is to say when and to what extent these four
countries liberalised. This varies according to
different indicators of openness, and different
studies of trade liberalisation, growth and poverty
reduction classify them differently. Second, the
impacts vary according to different measures of
poverty and inequality. Third, the article points to
the considerable impact of non-trade-related
variables on poverty during periods of liberalisation.
An example would be fluctuations in remittances
from migrant workers in the case of Pakistan.
Themodelling exercises also reveal how model
specifications have significant impacts on the way
that increased openness to trade is likely to impact
upon poverty. In particular, assumptions about the
mobility of factors between different activities make
a big difference to the way in which quota or tariff
reductions work through the economy. Similarly,
complementary policy measures, such as the way
in which taxes are raised to offset reductions in tariff
revenues, also have an impact on poverty.The point
here is not that modelling is an imperfect science,
the results of which are dependent on the
assumptions made, but rather that these different
assumptions reflect real-world differences in
economic structures and institutions that will vary
not only from country to country, but also from
sector to sector (mobility of factors is probably
higher in the manufacturing sector than in
agriculture, for example).
The article by Nadvi adopts a very different
methodological approach to issues of trade
liberalisation and poverty to that presented by
Round andWhalley. It is based upon case studies
of particular sectors and countries and inter-firm
linkages in the sectors studied. The studies
examined the impact upon the welfare of workers
in particular sectors of situations of both rapidly
increasing exports and rising import penetration.
As one might expect, the article shows real
benefits to the poor from rapid export growth in
countries and sectors that have been able to take
advantage of export opportunities in global markets.
Studies in Kenya and Bangladesh show how entry
into export sectors brings workers in households
above the poverty line.Workers in export sectors
earned higher incomes and had less casualised
employment than similar workers in non-export
sectors. The benefits of insertion are spread
unevenly, however, and there are concerns about
working conditions. Adverse working conditions,
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such as casual and seasonal employment, and
excessive overtime are often a response to volatility
and uncertainty of demand from export customers.
The analysis of the linkages between export
production and global markets indicates the
increasingly important role of large global buyers,
which has emerged in part as a result of the
concentration of retailing in advanced countries in
sectors such as garments, footwear and food. This
has a number of consequences. First, the barriers
to entry to the value chains controlled by large
buyers rise because of their emphasis on quality,
traceability, and codes and standards favour
countries and producers that have experience of
working with such requirements and also the
infrastructure to support and demonstrate
compliance with them.This may favour established
exporting countries, such as Kenya in the case of
horticulture, but present significant barriers to “late
entrants” such as Uganda. Second, there are
significant economies of scale in the provision of
specialist services and the logistics infrastructure
for flexibility and speed of response to customer
orders, and this also favours established producers.
The benefits of globalisation may be considerable
for particular countries and regions that have
established themselves as suppliers for particular
types of products, but other regions may find it
difficult to enter these product lines unless they are
able to find customers willing to help them meet
the requirements of export markets.
This raises particular challenges for poverty
reduction. Countries that have not managed to
develop export industries in the 1990s are at an
increasing disadvantage. Similarly, the increasing
complexity of global markets creates particular
challenges for small andmediumenterprises.Trade
capacity building programmes need to analyse the
changing nature of global markets in order to
identify adequate export promotion strategies.
At the same time, global buyers do offer points
of leverage for development policies.Nadvi suggests
that they can become development agents,
supporting the introduction of codes of conduct in
areas such as labour standards and environmental
impact. Global buyers have, for example, been
important components in the development of the
Ethical Trade Initiative in theUK. The challenge is
to integrate concerns about not only incomes and
basic working conditions, but also income security,
casualisation of work, excessive overtime, etc.
If trade in products such as garments and
horticulture is being increasingly structured by the
buying practices of global buyers, could the
development of B2B e-commerce radically alter this
scenario by creating new market linkages and
reducing the barriers to entry into global markets
for developing country producers? Research on
business-to-business (B2B) e-commerce in
developing countries by Humphrey, Mansell, Paré
and Schmitz addressed this issue. During (and for
a while after) the dot.com boom at the end of the
1990s, various development agencies enthusiastically
supported e-commerce as a means not only for
promoting access to global markets for small and
medium enterprises in developing countries, but
also for enabling producers to retain a larger share
of the final product price by cutting out
intermediaries. Online trading in “open”
e-marketplaces would enable the benefits of
globalisation to reach the poor.
Once again, the emphasis of the research was to
understand the way in which B2B e-commerce
operated in practice in developing countries and
to consider the policy implications of its use. An
analysis of e-marketplaces, which are often
presented as places where goods can be bought and
sold, showed that they were not so much genuine
marketplaces, as points of initial contact between
buyers and sellers. In each case, the actual sale or
purchase of a commodity required a lot of offline
work because the e-marketplaces rarely offered the
means of providing the information, payment
systems or delivery systems needed for genuine
online trading. Therefore, transaction costs were
not reduced, and in many cases intermediaries
operated in these e-marketplaces, providing the
support services needed for transactions to be
executed.
This finding was backed up by a study of use of
the internet, by approximately 80 firms in three
different countries in the garments and horticulture
sectors. It showed clearly that firms made very
limited use of e-marketplaces – not because they
did not explore the possibilities, but because
e-marketplaces either did not match the firms’
business models (which are often based upon
complex knowledge flows between buyer and seller)
or produced disappointing results. The number of
transactions were low and the transaction costs
involved in securing purchases and sales remained
very high.
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However, it was evident that the internet is
becoming increasingly important for coordinating
relationships between suppliers and buyers that
were already doing business with each other. It
greatly reduced the costs of transferring information
and opened up new forms of information transfer,
such as the provision of digital photographs to
indicate quality problems. Similarly, to the extent
that “auctions” were found to be taking place, these
were closed auctions, with access depending upon
invitations by global buyers, who generally restrict
them to established suppliers.The internet is being
used for business, but not in ways that radically
shift market structures.
The policy implications of these findings are
substantial. Major investments are being made in
developing the e-commerce infrastructure on the
assumption that online trading will take place. In
particular, online trading requires rapid, high-
capacity data linkages, and a legal infrastructure
cable of the supporting online contracts.However,
on the basis of the findings noted above, the priority
should be to establish reliable and cheaper internet
access so that firms are able to communicate with
buyers and suppliers at low cost.
2 FDI and finance
TheWhitePaper on international development issued
by the UK government in 2000 stated that ‘the
attraction of capital inflows is an essential element
of the strategy to speed up sustainable development
and poverty reduction’ (DFID 2000: 49). An
accompanying chart showing net long-term resource
flows to developing countries indicated that foreign
direct investment and other private capital flows
(portfolio investments andpurchases of bonds) had
increased considerably in the course of the 1990s.
By the end of the decade, these far surpassed official
flows (overseas development assistance andoverseas
development finance).The latter accounted for less
than US$50 billion of total net long-term flows of
almost US$350 billion in 1997.Themain concerns
of theWhite Paper were twofold: (1) to ensure that
these flows weredirectedmore effectively to thepoor,
through mechanisms facilitating investment in the
micro and small enterprise sector, and (2) topromote
improved domestic policies to ensure increased
private capital flows.
For capital flows to be stable and productive,
developing countries need to put in place improved
domestic policies. And the conditions that attract
foreign investment are the same conditions that
generate domestic savings, promote domestic
investment, and discourage capital flight. They
include: an economic and political environment
that is stable and predictable, supported by
transparent laws, fair competition and reliable legal
systems; and the reduction of administrative barriers
to investment. (DFID 2000: 50)
With the East Asian crisis clearly in mind, the
White Paper does emphasise the risks involved in
rapid capital account liberalisation and in particular,
the need for effective systems of financial regulation.
Nevertheless, it expects private flows to play an
important part in developing country finance,
including for the poorest developing countries, and
views capital account liberalisation as a means of
enabling this. The onus is on developing countries
to develop policies that are both “finance friendly”
and able to regulate financial markets adequately.
The three articles on FDI in financial flows in
this Bulletin cast doubt on these assumptions and
point to a very different policy agenda. The article
by Morrissey and Osei examines the levels and
volatility of different types of capital flows – official
development assistance, official development
finance, FDI and “other private capital” (OPC, which
includes commercial bank lending, bonds, other
private credit, non-debt flows and portfolio equity
investments) – in the period from 1970 to 1997.
Data from 60 countries is categorised into four
country groupings: low-income, lower-middle
income, and upper-middle income, as well as the
African countries included in the analysis.
It is well known that flows of private capital (FDI
and OPC) are concentrated in a relatively small
number of middle-income developing countries.
Morrissey and Osei’s analysis demonstrates the
extent to which the poorest developing countries
have beenmarginal recipients of such flows. Private
capital flows to the upper-middle income countries
accelerated in the 1990s, so that FDI and OPC
together reached 7.2 per cent of the gross domestic
product (GDP) in the 1996–97 period, compared
with just 0.9 per cent for official development
finance. For the low-income countries, FDI and
OPC were dwarfed by aid flows, even during the
1990s. In 1996–97, FDI and OPC rose to 1.6 per
cent of GDP in the 29 low-income countries
included in the sample, but in the same period,
overseas development assistance to the same
countries ran at the level of 12.2 per cent of GDP.2
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These flows are low, and they are unlikely to
generate the finance for micro and small enterprises
seen as desirable by theWhite Paper. In fact, insofar
as some portfolio investment in developing
countries is associated with foreign investment in
the banking system, the access of small producers
to finance is likely to fall. Large banks are less likely
to have the credit systems or willingness to invest
resources in allocating small-scale credit.3
Morrissey and Osei go on to argue that the
volatility of capital flows are equally important as
the level of these flows, because increased volatility
in capital flows has a negative effect on growth, as
shown by Lensink and Morrissey (2001). As one
might expect, the level of volatility is generally
lowest for official development assistance and
finance, higher for FDI, and highest of all for OPC.
Perhaps more worryingly, theMorrissey and Osei
data show that the poorest countries are particularly
vulnerable to volatility inOPC.Whereas the levels
of volatility of official development assistance and
finance and FDI are roughly equivalent between
the different categories of country, the level of
volatility ofOPC is substantially higher for the low-
income countries. This volatility increases the risk
of macroeconomic instability, particularly in the
context of exchange rate liberalisation and the risks
to investors from exchange rate volatility. This risk
itself leads to reduced capital flows, or increased
risk premia, and can exacerbate cyclical behaviour
as the effects of macroeconomic imbalances are
magnified by the investor response.
Morrissey and Osei include in their policy
recommendations better provision of information
about both investment opportunities (to increase
capital flows) and economic indicators (to reduce
volatility), as well as support from international
financial institutions. This approach remains
focused on the recipient countries and their
fundamentals. The articles by FitzGerald and by
Griffith-Jones andOcampo, in contrast, provide a
different perspective on this issue, which reframes
the policy debate on private capital flows to
developing countries. Rather than seeing the
problems of low levels of capital flows and volatility
as ones which should be addressed primarily
through policies adopted in and by the recipient
countries (the developing countries), these articles
argue that the policy challenges lie in the source
countries and in the international financial
architecture.
FitzGerald’s article provides an econometric
analysis of the determinants of portfolio capital
flows. The volatility of these flows is well-
established. FitzGerald’s contribution is to show
that “source country” factors – interest rates,
changing levels of risk aversion and income levels
in the USA – combined with market effects that
lead to momentum trading, herding and price
bubbles that amplify the effect of these factors, are
responsible for a substantial amount of the observed
variation in portfolio capital flows from theUSA to
developing countries.
Overall, this model can explain 81 per cent of
observed variations in bond flows and 87 per
cent of those in yield spreads. This implies that
by far the greater part of emerging bondmarket
volatility is explained by market interactions
(expressed by the persistence in flows and
spreads as well as their lagged effect on each
other) on the one hand; and the combination of
home risk aversion, home interest rates and
home income levels on the other. In other words
as far as this asset class as a whole is concerned,
shifts in the demand schedule and their effects
are more significant than overall fundamentals
[i.e. recipient country factors]. (FitzGerald, this
Bulletin)
If the “problem” emanates from developed
countries, to what extent is it possible to seek
“solutions” there as well? FitzGerald suggests that
changes in regulatory or tax incentives could
encourage institutional investors in these regions
to hold assets of longer maturity and he also argues
that international financial institutions couldmake
a stronger commitment to counter-cyclical
interventions in markets for developing country
assets. Failing this, developing countries should
introduce capital controls aimed at reducing volatility.
These issues are taken up in a more general
review of the challenges facing the international
financial architecture by Griffith-Jones andOcampo.
They start by observing that the international
financial architecture has two goals: financial
stability (avoidance of currency and banking crises)
and the promotion of private capital flows to
developing countries.While the former was highest
on the agenda following the East Asian crisis, the
sharp decline in capital flows since then brings the
latter onto the agenda as amatter of urgency.
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Their diagnosis is that much more effort has
been devoted to implementing policies in the host
countries, particularly transparency and codes and
standards in the financial sector, but that efforts to
address issues relating to the international financial
architecture (stability funds, orderly debt workouts,
etc.) have been much less successful. They also
suggest that the issues of the volatility of flows and
contagion, particularly as they apply to middle-
income countries, have been the main focus of
concern, while the issue of declining overall levels
of private capital inflows into developing countries,
and the continuing low levels of flows to the poorest
countries, have received scant attention.
Griffith-Jones andOcampopoint to the weakness
of arrangements aimed at limiting contagion –
particularly the Contingency Credit Line and the
Supplementary Reserve Facility. Both need to be
modified in order to make them more agile and
more responsive to the needs of countries affected
by, or likely to be affected by, financial instability.
They further note that attempts to improve
international financial regulation have not had the
desired results.On one hand, attempts to improve
the consistency in coverage of financial regulations
have run up against opposition from developed
countries, and particularly the USA, who are not
willing to increase regulation of their financial
sectors.On the other hand, proposedmodifications
to the BaselCapitalAccord aimed at modifying the
capital requirements of banks to increase financial
stability seem likely not only to ‘further reduce
international bank lending and increase costs of
such lending to developing countries, particularly
those (the large majority) that do not have
investment grades’, but also to ‘exacerbate pro-
cyclical tendencies within the banking systems’
(Griffith-Jones andOcampo, this Bulletin).
This leads Griffith-Jones andOcampo to argue
that the problem with the proposed Basel Capital
Accord is not just that it might reduce capital flows
and increase volatility, but that the proposals were
put forward without any clear appreciation of the
impact that they would have on developing
countries.Although the latter are severely affected
by these arrangements, they are small markets
within the international financial system and hardly
considered in financial policy making.
Therefore, they identify the need for greater
developing country voice in international financial
institutions and arrangements as essential if the
problems of low flows and volatility are to be
addressed adequately. To this end, they suggest a
greatly enhanced role for regional institutions in
international finance, particularly regional and sub-
regional development banks. These institutions
should have an enhanced role in crisis management
and development finance. Beyond this, they argue
that in the face of the weak commitment to reform
of the international financial system displayed by
industrialised countries,developing countries might
have to take the initiative, organising themselves
and establishing links with pro-reform institutions
(including development agencies) in developed
countries.
While Griffith-Jones and Ocampo do not
underplay the difficulties involved in forcing
through reforms in the international financial
system, they do suggest that developing countries
shouldmake adherence to codes and standards on
financial regulation and liberalisation of capital
accounts dependent on reformof the global financial
system.
This focus on the governance of the international
financial architecture and the interplay of interest
between developed and developing countries links
closely with the third set of articles in this Bulletin,
which are concerned with the institutions of global
governance.
3 Global governance
Globalisation is often defined as the increasingly
free movement of factors. Nevertheless, however
free the movement of factors becomes, it will be
regulated by rules and through the institutional
processes that devise and enforce these rules.These
processes embody choices about what is to be
regulated (and what is not to be regulated), by which
bodies and with which composition, and the
procedures for enforcing rules and agreements.
They determine not only exemptions to the free
movement of factors, such as the Multifibre
Arrangement and the treatment of agricultural
subsidies, but also what rules are to apply to all
countries, which has significant consequences.4
The stakes involved in global governance are
rising. First, there is an extension of global
negotiation processes into new areas, such as climate
change, biotechnology and the service sector.
Second, in the long-established area of trade, the
scope of negotiations and agreements has extended
into trade-related areas such as competition policy,
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trade in services, regulation of the financial sector
and intellectual property rights. Third, the
consequences of making commitments are rising.
TheUruguay Round, for example, introduced the
concept of the “single undertaking”, which meant
that countries have to accept or reject the whole
package, rather than sign up to individual parts.
The increasing difficulty in reversing commitments
made in negotiations also raises the stakes.
The articles on global governance in this Bulletin
cover a variety of issues, from trade negotiations,
to climate change, biotechnology, and trade in
services.They raise a number of common concerns,
which have also been highlighted by other work in
this area.5 First, these agreements have direct
consequences for the livelihoods of poor people.
Second, developing countries need amore effective
voice in the processes of rule determination.
Multilateral negotiations offer the possibility for
developing countries to influence outcomes, but
in order to take advantage of this opportunity,
developing countries need the resources, skills and
experience to negotiate effectively. Third, the
potential influence that can be exercised in the
context of multilateral negotiations highlights the
importance of these negotiations and, conversely
both the often pernicious effects of bilateral and
plurilateral negotiations.
The article by Page focuses on the effective
participation of developing countries in trade and
climate change negotiations. It draws from a broader
research project that examined the participation of
three small developing countries – Bolivia, Guyana
and Zimbabwe – in such negotiations. It notes the
importance of these negotiations for poverty
reduction and argues strongly that participation by
developing countries can influence outcomes. A
comparison of developing country participation in
trade negotiations up to and including theCancun
ministerial meeting in September 2003 demonstrate
clearly the ways in which developing countries have
increased their capacity not only to contest but also
to define and develop agendas.
It has long been accepted that the capacity for
developing countries to participate in trade
negotiations needs to be enhanced. Page takes the
analysis further by highlighting three critical points.
First, the formation of developing country alliances
is particularly important for enabling developing
countries to influence outcomes. These alliances
are often not based on regions for trade blocs, but
on interest groups around specific issues. Second,
the translation of negotiating skills into negotiating
outcomes depends upon the nature of the
negotiations themselves. The assent of developing
countries is necessary to bring multilateral
negotiations to a successful conclusion. This
provides them with some negotiating power.
Conversely, in bilateral negotiations, the same
negotiators that are effective in multilateral
negotiations find themselves impotent. This shows
the potential dangers of bilateral negotiations, which
have also been highlighted by theCommission on
Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR 2002: 162–3).
Page suggests that this is a problem that will affect
smaller developing countries in particular, because
the larger developing countries will seek to develop
bilateral deals with multiple partners. Third, the
increasing voice of developing countries in
multilateral negotiations creates problems for the
informal procedures that in the past havemanaged
to create consensus within trade negotiations.These
show signs of strain as more countries, and country
groupings, wish to have their voices heard. The
difficulties at Doha andCancun illustrate the need
to create negotiating mechanisms that reflect the
increasing diversity and complexity of negotiating
positions.
The article by Newell andMackenzie focuses on
governancemechanisms for modern biotechnology,
and in particular the ways in which they impact
upon food security issues, which directly affect the
poor. The global governance of modern
biotechnology takes place through a variety of
institutions.As well as specific agreements devoted
to biosafety, such as the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety (CPB), trade in genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) is also subject to regulation by
the WTO, particularly agreements on Technical
Barriers to Trade and Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures. These circumscribe developing country
policy choices in the area of food security.
Again, it is recognised that the participation of
developing countries in negotiations that affect
them directly requires resources and capabilities
that are often lacking. The issues are complex and
the impacts of particular decisions unclear. As
important, there appeared to be clear conflict of
priorities between developed and developing
countries, around questions such as the balance
between considerations of food safety, rural
livelihoods and market displacement on the one
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hand and the goals of food security and reducing
trade barriers on the other. Overall, global
governance institutions prioritise the reduction of
trade barriers over food security concerns.
Newell and Mackenzie also challenge the
tendency to look for a “one size fits all” solution to
global regulation. The attempt to produce a
common set of standards and procedures applicable
to all countries fails to recognise important
differences in capabilities. They argue that: ‘The
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is centred on an
effective system of national import licensing… that
places resource and capacity demands on
bureaucracies that they may not be in the position
tomeet, particularly in developing country settings’,
and they note that the procedures in place for
controlling trade in and use of GMOs are taxing
even developed country governments. It is
unrealistic to impose control mechanisms that
developing countries cannot enforce effectively.
Similarly, the application of standardised rules
and regulations, often developed by advanced
countries and attuned to the needs of farming
systems in those countries, fails to respond
adequately to the needs of food producers in
developing countries.While developing countries
have the right to adjust their own legislation on
biotechnology use, plant varieties and risk
assessment, they need considerable expertise to
understand fully the issues and develop their own
agendas. In other words, flexibilities in the
application of global agreements require considerable
developing country capabilities in order for them
to be used effectively. Furthermore, they need to be
able to resist the linkage of these issues to questions
of aid and preferential trade access, which can be
used to pressure developing countries.
The third article on global governance focuses
on the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) and its possible implications for the water
sector in developing countries.TheGATS generally,
and water privatisation and its impact on poor
people in developing countries in particular, have
been one of the issues of greatest disagreement
between “pro” and “anti” globalisers. The issue of
water goes to the heart of the role of markets and
the extent of social provision.
Mehta and la Cour Madsen open their article by
discussing whether water should be considered a
commodity or ahuman right.This contrast appears,
at first sight, to go to the heart of the question: is
water a right that deserves guaranteed (and most
likely public) provision, or is it a commodity whose
provision can be related to the ability to pay and
supplied by profit-making enterprises in the private
sector?However, the article recognises that public
provision in developing countries has had serious
deficiencies in coverage, and there are a range of
options around privatisation that could, for
example, leave delivery and charging to the public
sector, or establish safeguards around procedures
for disconnection.
In spite of this, the authors are not sanguine
about the possible impact of privatisation on water
services. They observe that privatisation has been
accompanied by price increases and that
governments are frequently unable tomonitor and
enforce contract provisions. Privatisation has to be
seen in the context of the complex interplay of
power and interests rather than simply contractual
obligations and possible efficiency gains.
Very similar issues arise when considering the
possible impact of the GATS on water provision.
One reading of the situation is that there is absolutely
nothing to be concerned about: ‘Domestic water
service delivery is not officially one of the sectors
covered by theGATS’, and countries making offers
and commitments under the GATS have ample
latitude to limit the liberalisation of trade in services.
Nevertheless, Mehta and la Cour Madsen argue
that:
while liberalising water-related services under
the GATS may not necessarily undermine, de
jure, the ability of member-states to introduce
the kind of legislativemeasures that are necessary
to safeguard the interests of the poor, there are
a number of reasons to think that, de facto, the
exercise of policy autonomy might be
substantially curtailed. These constraints on the
capacity of member-states to protect the poor
stem from (a) inherent ambiguities in treaty
interpretation; and (b) the politics of process
arising out of power asymmetries and a lack of
transparency in processes of negotiation and
policy review. (Mehta and la Cour Madsen, this
Bulletin)
In particular, they argue that (1) the basic
rationale of the GATS is to promote liberalisation
of trade in services; (2) the EuropeanCommission
is already pressing for water service delivery to be
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included within “environmental services” and
negotiated within the GATS; (3) the bid/offer
procedure used to define commitments under the
GATSmakes considerable demands on developing
country analytical and negotiating capacity and
also creates ample scope for the pressures typical
of bilateral trade negotiations, including the linkage
of deals on GATS to aid and negotiations around
trade; (4) there is a likelihood of restrictions being
placed on developing country regulatory regimes
by the application ofWTO disciplines on technical
standards and barriers to trade; (5) developing
country governments have difficulties in enforcing
agreements made with transnational service
companies; and (6) there are difficulties in
perceiving the consequences of particular
commitments and the obstacles and costs placed
in the way of reversing these commitments should
their desirability be reassessed.
Mehta and la Cour Madsen suggest that the
consequences of all this might well be commitments
made by developing countries in the context of the
GATS that would be detrimental to social
provisioning. One of the factors preventing this
happening is possibly the perception of the degree
of risk involved, which is making developing
countries very cautious about making commitments.
Once again, a study of the way that global
governance mechanisms are put into practice not
only at the point of negotiating general principles,
but also in their application on the groundhighlights
the enormous demands placed upon developing
country governments, which face not only much
better resourced developed country counterparts,
but also the resources of global companies that are
looking to maximise the benefits to them from
globalisation processes.
The programmeof research on globalisation and
poverty has been only a minute part of the global
research effort on the topic in the past few years.
Many other researchers and programmes have been
concerned with this issue. The distinctive
contributions of the programme have been (1) the
focus on three distinct aspects of globalisation –
production and trade, finance and FDI, and global
governance; (2) its focus on the world’s poorer
countries, predominantly with sub-SaharanAfrica
and South Asia, and within them, the impact of
globalisation processes on poorer households; (3)
its recognition of the heterogeneity of globalisation
processes and country circumstances; and (4) its
concern with tracing the processes andmechanisms
of globalisation that translate globalisation processes
into poverty outcomes.The result is a set of findings
that contribute to narrowing the gulf that exists
between “globophobes” and “globophiles” by
providing explanations of why globalisation
outcomes vary so much and suggesting ways in
which globalisation processes can be managed so
as to enhance the livelihoods of poor people.
Introduction
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Notes
* John Humphrey is the Director of the Globalisation and
Poverty Research Programme. The views expressed in this
introduction are not necessarily sharedby the contributors
ofarticles to this Bulletin.Themanagement of theprogramme
was financed by the UK Department for International
Development (DFID) (grant R7592), but the views and
opinions expressed are those of the author alone.
1. See, for example, Aninat (2002), references in the UK
government White Paper on globalisation (DFID 2000)
to globalisation being ‘managed well’ and ‘managed badly’.
2. Research by Jenkins andThomas (2002) indicates clearly
that individual countries have received significant private
capital inflows.These are often related to natural resources
(particularly mining and petroleum) and infrastructure
investments, such as the LesothoHighlandWater Scheme
and theMaputo transport corridor.
3. This point was made recently by RobertoFelletti, President
of the BancoCuidad in Argentina at a seminar on global
value chains in Buenos Aires, October 2003.
4. Even the most technical of rules – for example, the
agreement of common standards for third generation
wireless telecommunications – have significant
implications for particular countries and firms. Given
the heterogeneity of previous telecommunications
standards, the decision about whether the new common
standard is derived from one or other of the earlier
generation of standards would provide one set of
manufacturers with an advantage over the others.
5. See, in particular, the report of the intellectual property
rights and development policy (CIPR 2002), which
highlights many issues of concern relating not only to
intellectual property rights, but also the processes by
which these are agreed and enforced.
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